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Abstract
Stollery (1998) studied a polluting oil extracting economy governed by the con-
stant utility criterion. The pollution caused the growth of temperature, nega-
tively a¤ecting production and utility. Stollery provided a closed form solution
for the case with the Cobb-Douglas production function and temperature a¤ect-
ing only production. This paper o¤ers a closed form solution to a non-trivial
example of this economy with utility a¤ected by temperature.
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1. Introduction
A social planner in Stollerys (1998) problem followed a constant utility
criterion where utility and production were negatively a¤ected by irreversible
global warming resulting from oil use. Stollery obtained the closed form so-
lutions, considering the case with temperature a¤ecting only production for
the extended Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz (DHSS) model (Dasgupta and Heal,
1974; Solow, 1974; Stiglitz, 1974) under the Hartwick investment rule (Hartwick,
1977).1 Stollery did not consider the case where temperature a¤ected utility,
noting that exactly the same energy path results from temperature e¤ects in
a standard constant elasticity utility function(Stollery, 1998, p. 734).
However, the case with utility a¤ected by global warming raises some in-
teresting and important questions since the negative e¤ect of temperature can
represent an aggregate damage resulting from economic activity. For example,
Bazhanov (2009b) analyzed a solution to this problem for an imperfect econ-
omy that has been extracting the resource for a period of time before considering
the goal of sustainable development in the form of the constant utility criterion.
This approach showed that the economy can be sustainable or unsustainable de-
pending on the parameters of the hazard function and on the technology and the
initial endowments of the economy. The result implied the necessity of a more
general notion of sustainability (semisustainability) that can provide an oppor-
tunity for an economy to decline asymptotically to a su¢ cient survival level
instead of collapsing in nite time after a period of overconsumption. A similar
problem arises in the cases when utility is positively a¤ected by the remaining
resource stock, e.g., when the stock has an amenity value (Krautkraemer, 1985;
Schubert and dAutume, 2008).
In Bazhanov (2009b), the problem was studied numerically using a di¤eren-
tial equation for capital, which implied all other paths in the economy including
the path of the hazard function. The current paper provides the closed form
1Stollery showed that the Hartwick rule is still optimal in this problem.
2
solution for a specic case in this economy. Unlike Bazhanov (2009b), where
the problem was formulated for an imperfect economy with the given state of
the oil extraction industry (the initial rate of extraction), this paper o¤ers a
conventionally specied example for the given initial assets of capital and the
resource reserve. The uncertainty of policy recommendations in this case is
discussed using a numerical example, which resembles the current state of the
worlds oil extracting industry.
2. The model
Stollery provided a closed form solution to an oil-burning DHSS economy2
with the production function negatively a¤ected by growing temperature and
with an isoelastic utility that depended only on consumption. The current paper
considers the case with utility alone a¤ected by the hazard function T: A social
planner chooses the path of per capita consumption c (by choosing a saving
rule) and the path of the per capita resource extraction r (by choosing a tax)
to maximize the constant over time level of per capita utility u :
u(c; T ) =
 
cT 1
(1 )
=(1  ) = u = const [c(t); r(t)]! max
c(t);r(t)
: (1)
The balance equation and the production function are
q(t) = c(t) + _k(t) = k(t)r(t); (2)
where q and k are per capita output and capital; ;  2 (0; 1); + < 1;  > :3
The optimal investment rule is _k := dk=dt = rqr = q; where qr := @q=@r:
Stollery assumed that technical change compensated for the e¤ect of growing
2The Cobb-Douglas production function, which is used in the DHSS model, has become one
of the most popular tools in Resource Economics both for theoretical studies (e.g., Dasgupta
and Heal, 1979; Asheim, 2005, Hamilton and Withagen, 2007) and for practical applications,
e.g., for the global climate change assessment (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000).
3The share of labor in this problem is 1      : The Solow (1974) condition  > 
guarantees the convergence of the integral
R1
0 rdt:
3
population, so there are no explicit technical advances in the model, and popu-
lation is constant.4 The hazard T grows with the resource extraction:
T (t) = T [r(t)] = T0


Z t
0
r()d + 1
'
= T0[(s0   s(t)) + 1]'; (3)
where ; ' > 0 are the parameters, s0 is the initial per capita oil stock, and
s = s(t) is the current oil stock, implying r =   _s: Function T can vary from
constant to polynomial depending on the value of ':5
The constant utility criterion requires the following paths of per capita out-
put q; consumption c; and, di¤erentiating q; the path of the growth rate _q=q :
q(t) = q0 f[s0   s(t)] + 1g' ; (4)
c(t) = c0 f[s0   s(t)] + 1g' ; (5)
_q(t)
q(t)
=
'r(t)
 [s0   s(t)] + 1 : (6)
The rate of growth for ' > 0 is positive, declining starting from
_q(0)
q(0)
= 'r0; (7)
and approaching zero with t ! 1: The optimal initial consumption is c0 =
(1   )q0; where q0 = k0 r0 ; and the value of the initial rate of extraction
r0 = r0(k0; s0; ';) is linked to the initial stocks and the intensity of the hazard
via the e¢ ciency condition s0 =
R1
0
r(t)dt: 6
In contrast to the Solow-Hartwick case (' = 0), per capita output and
consumption grow here under the same Hartwick investment rule when ' > 0:
The growth is limited by
q1 = q0 fs0 + 1g' and (8)
c1 = c0 fs0 + 1g' (9)
4A plausible alternative to this assumption can be a TFP (Total Factor Productivity)
compensating for capital decay. In more details see Bazhanov (2009a).
5The specications of utility and temperature functions are di¤erent here from the ones
considered by Stollery; in particular, Stollery related temperature to the remaining resource
stock (T 0(s(t)) < 0); here temperature depends on the extracted (burned) resource stock
(T 0(s0   s(t)) > 0). The other di¤erences are discussed in Bazhanov (2009b).
6See, e.g., formulas (40) and (41).
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respectively. The limit for temperature growth is T1 = T0 (s0+ 1)
'
: The
only source of output and consumption growth is a redistribution of the re-
source among generations. A social planner imposes a positive declining tax on
extraction, resulting in a lower rate of initial extraction (implying lower c0 and
q0) and a slower decline in the rates of extraction. Namely, from the speci-
cation of the production function, the equation for the rate of output growth
is _q=q =  _k=k +  _r=r: Then, given _k0 = q0 and using (7), the initial rate of
change in the rate of extraction is _r0=r0 = ['r0   q0=k0] = or
_r0
r0
=
r0

h
'  k 10 r 10
i
yielding the following condition:
_r0 R 0 i¤ ' R

k1 0 r
1 
0
: (10)
This condition, however, does not directly imply that a growing initial extraction
can be optimal in this problem because r0 declines with the growth of ': A
specic example of the optimal _r0 > 0 is provided in Section 4, condition (42).
The growth of output and the declining to zero ow of the resource imply
an unbounded growth of capital in this problem.
The constant-utility criterion in the form of (1) seemingly implies that the
optimal initial values of q0 = c0=(1   ) and c0 should depend on the prefer-
ence parameter  and the initial temperature T0; namely, cT 1 = bu = const =
[u(1  )]1=(1 ) yielding c0 = T0 [u(1  )]1=(1 ) : However, since  is a con-
stant here, the optimal policy in this framework maximizes bu and the corre-
sponding value of u(bu; ) regardless of the preference parameter. As to the
value of T0 as a preindustrial levelof temperature, the normalization T0 = 1
can be used assuming that the hazard does not a¤ect utility when the resource is
not being extracted. Hence, problem (1) is equivalent to the problem of nding
bu = const [c(t); r(t)] = max
c(t);r(t)
c(t)T [r(t)]
 1 (11)
with T0 = 1 in formula (3).
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For obtaining the optimality conditions, Stollery used the approach of Leonard
and Long (1992, pp. 300-304), which reformulates problem (11) into the follow-
ing equivalent problem:
maximize V (t) 
Z 1
t
bue d for t = 0 (V (0) = bu = const) (12)
for an arbitrary constant  subject to (omitting the dependence on time)
_k = q   c; _s =  r; and bu = u(c; T ): (13)
The Hamiltonian of this problem is
H = bue t + k(q   c)  sr: (14)
The utility constraint yields the Lagrangian to be maximized:
L = H + (u  bu):
In the general case, when both production and utility are a¤ected by the hazard,
the Pontryagin-type necessary conditions for the state variables k and s are7
Lc = uc   k = 0; (15)
Lr = kqr   s = 0; (16)
_k =  
@L
@k
=  kqk; (17)
_s =  
@L
@s
=   (kqT + uT )Ts0 s  @(s0   s)=@s; (18)Z 1
0
Lbudt =
Z 1
0
 
e t    dt = 1  Z 1
0
dt = 0: (19)
Eq. (18) with k from Eq. (15) results in
_s = Ts0 suc

qT +
uT
uc

: (20)
7Here k and s are indexed dual variables unlike uc; qk; and qr; which are the partial
derivatives of u and q:
6
The time derivative of Eq. (16) is _s = _kqr + k _qr; which, divided by qr and
combined with Eq. (20), gives
_qr
qr
k + _k =
Ts0 suc
qr

qT +
uT
uc

:
Substitution for _k from Eq. (17) with k from Eq. (15) yields
_qr
qr
= qk +
Ts0 s
qr

qT +
uT
uc

; (21)
which is the Hotelling rule with the negative additional term (t) := Ts0 s (qT + uT =uc) =qr
resulting from the e¤ects of the externality. The fact that (t) 6= 0 in the pres-
ence of the hazard factor (' > 0) implies that the optimal paths in this
problem can only be asymptotically e¢ cient because the standard Hotelling
rule ( = 0) as a necessary e¢ ciency condition8 is satised only with t ! 1
due to exhaustion of the resource.
Stollery obtained the optimality of the Hartwick rule from the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation9 for the problem (12), (13) instead of using necessary
conditions (15) (19). Namely, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation estab-
lishes the following link between the maximized Hamiltonian and value function:
 @V =@t = H: (22)
An autonomous innite-horizon problem such as (12), (13) has the property:
V (t) = V (0)e t:10 Then  @V =@t = V (0)e t = bue t and H = bue t +
Vk _k + Vs _s (k and 

s are the shadow prices of capital and the resource stock)
yielding k _k+

s _s = 0, which means that the investment 

k
_k must be equal to
the resource rent sr under optimal prices (Hartwick, 1977).
In this framework, the equations for the optimal paths in the economy can
be derived from
a) the condition cT 1 = bu = const;
b) the Hartwick rule, which provides the maximum level of bu;
8See, e.g., Dasgupta and Heal (1979).
9See, e.g., Leonard and Long (1992, p. 182-183).
10Leonard and Long (1992, Theorem 9.4.1, p. 293).
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c) the balance equation (2) specifying the production function, and
d) the Hotelling rule (21), which gives the optimal tax on extraction.
3. Optimal paths
The optimal path of output (4) can be written as q(t) = q0
h

R t
0
r()d + 1
i'
:
Raising to the power 1=' yields q1=' = q1='0
h

R t
0
r()d + 1
i
(restriction ' 6= 0
will be lifted below). Time derivative, substituting for r = q1=k = ; is
q1=' 1 _q=' = q1='0 r = q
1='
0 q
1=k = : This equation with the optimal saving
rule gives a system of the two di¤erential equations in q and k :
q1=' 1 1=dq=dt = 'q1='0 k
 = ;
dk=dt = q:
Following Schubert and dAutume (2008), the system can be solved by elimi-
nating time (dt = dk=(q)): q1=' 1=dq = A1k =dk; whereA1 = 'q
1='
0 = >
0: Integration gives q1+1=' 1==(1 + 1='   1=) = A1k1 ==(1   =) + C1
or qa = A2k1 = + C2; where a = 1 + 1='   1= = ['(   1) + ]=(') and
A2 = aA1=(1   =): Note that a R 0 and A2 Q 0 when ' Q =(1   ):
Calibration at t = 0 gives C2 = qa0 (1   B1k1 =0 ); where B1 = A2q a0 =
q
1= 1
0  ['(1=   1)  1] =(  ) (B1 R 0 when A2 R 0). Then
q = q0

B1k
 (= 1) + C3
b
; (23)
where C3 = 1   B1k1 =0 and b = 1=a = '=['(   1) + ]: Henceforth, the
restriction ' 6= 0 is not relevant; the case with ' ! =(1   ) causing b ! 1
is considered below.
Eq. (23) shows that q(t) ! q = q0Cb3; and the saving rule implies that
c(t)! c = q0(1  )Cb3 as k(t)!1 with t!1: The obtained expression for
q combined with the optimal saving rule gives a di¤erential equation in capital,
and then the dynamics of the economy is dened by the following system:
_k = _k0

B1k
 (= 1) + C3
b
; (24)
r(t) = q(t)1=k(t) = ; (25)
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where _k0 = _k(0) = q0:
The case with ' = 0 implies b = 0; yielding linear capital k(t) = q0t+ k0;
which coincides with the Solow-Hartwick case and with Stollerys solution for
 = 0: The extraction in this case is r(t) = r0 (r1t+ 1)
 =
; where r1 = q0=k0:
For the case with '! =(1 ); implying a! 0 or b!1; Eq. (24) can be
rewritten as follows: _k = _k0Cb3
 
1 + k (= 1)B1=C3
b
or _k = _k0Cb3
 
1  k (= 1)aB5
1=a
;
where B5 := q
 a
0 A1=
h
(   1)C3
i
: Note that C3 ! 1 when a ! 0; but Cb3 =
(1 + aB6k
 (= 1)
0 )
1=a; where B6 := q
 a
0 A1=(

   1) > 0; so lima!0 Cb3 =
exp
h
B6k
 (= 1)
0
i
and lima!0B5 = B6: Then, Eq. (24) takes the form
_k = _k0e
B6k
 (= 1)
0 e B6k
 (= 1)
: (26)
Eq. (24) is integrable in quadratures:Z k(t)
k0
d{ 
B1{ (= 1) + C3
b = _k0t+ Const; (27)
however, in the general case, k(t) obtained from this equation cannot be ex-
pressed in elementary functions.11 The following section provides a nontrivial
(' 6= 0) example with the closed form solution to Eq. (24).
A di¤erential equation for the tax on extraction (t) can be obtained from
Eq. (21) using the fact that the resource price with no imperfections qr   
should satisfy the standard Hotelling rule (  0):
d(qr  )=dt
qr   = qk:
11The LHS of Eq. (27) can be expressed using special functions. For ex-
ample, in the case with a = 0; this equation takes the form of a nonlin-
ear equation in k : z(k) = _k0 exp(B6k
 (= 1)
0 )t + Const; where z(k) =
D1(k)


 
B6k=(1 + ) + 1
 WhittakerM(D2; D3; B6k) + (1 + ) WhittakerM  D2 + 1; D3; B6k ;
with  := 1   =; D1(k) := B (1+3)=(2)6 k(1 3)=2 exp
  B6k=2 =(1 + 2);
D2 := (2   )=(2); D3 := (1 + 2)=(2): Here WhittakerM() is the Whittaker M
special function, which is available, e.g., in Maple or Mathematica software. When a = 0
and  = 2; the LHS of Eq. (27) is z(k) = k exp( B6=k)   Ei(1; B6=k); where Ei() is the
Exponential integral special function, which is also available in computational software.
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This equation gives the dynamic condition for the tax depending on the path
of the Hotelling rule modier (t) :
_ qk   qr = 0: (28)
Eq. (28) has a solution12
(t) = 0 (k(t)=k0)
=   qr(t)
h
(q(t)=q0)
1= 1   1
i
; (29)
where 0 = (0) is the initial condition.
The value of 0 can be expressed from the formula for the initial resource
price with no imperfections: qr(0)   (0) = q00=r00; where q00 = k0
 
r00

and
r00 satises Eq. (32). Namely,
0 = 
n
k0 r
 1
0   k0= [s0(  )]
o
: (30)
In the case with  = 0; there is no tax since r0 = r00: Eq. (30) yields the optimal
initial tax that is required to obtain the optimal initial rate of extraction r0;
dened in the conventional approach from the e¢ ciency condition given k0; s0; ';
and . Eq. (30) can be inverted to show the link between the value of 0 and
the resulting value of r0 : r
 1
0 = [0s0(  ) + k0] = [k0 s0(  )] or
r0 =

(  )s0=k1 0
1 + (  )s00= (k0)
 1
1 
; (31)
which coincides with the r00 in the Solow-Hartwick case (0 = 0)
r00 =

(  )s0=k1 0
 1
1  (32)
and monotonically declines to zero with 0 !1:
4. An example of a closed form solution
Let ' =  and  = 2: Then b = a = 1; A2 = aA1=(1   =) =  A1 =
 q1=0  < 0; B1 = A2q a0 =  q1= 10  < 0; and C3 = 1 + k1 0 r1 0 > 0: In
this case, Eq. (24) becomes
_k =
B4
k
+ C4; (33)
12See Bazhanov (2009a, Appendix 1).
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where B4 := _k0B1 < 0 and C4 := _k0C3 > 0: Eq. (33) in quadratures, denoting
D0 := B4=C4 = B1=C3 < 0; isZ
k
k +D0
dk = C4t+ bC;
where bC is the constant of integration. Integration of the LHS yields
k  D0 ln (k +D0) = C4t+ bC: (34)
After denoting x := ln (k +D0) ; the last equation becomes ex   D0(x + 1) =
C4t + bC or ex = D0 (x  p) ; where p :=  C4t=D0   1   bC=D0: Multiplication
of both sides by  e x+p=D0 results in the equation  ep=D0 = e(p x) (p  x) ;
which, by the denition of the Lambert W function,13 has the solution
p  x =W ( ep=D0) :
Then, k +D0 = exp [p W ( ep=D0)] =  D0 [ ep=D0] e W ( ep=D0): The def-
inition of the Lambert W function implies that W (z) = ze W (z); transforming
the last equation as follows: k +D0 =  D0W ( ep=D0) or
k(t) =  D0
8<:1 +W
0@ e C4D0 t 1  bCD0
D0
1A9=; ; (35)
where bC; dened from Eq. (34) at t = 0; is bC = k0   D0 ln (k0 +D0) : After
substitution for bC into Eq. (35), it becomes
k(t) = D0

 1 W

e 
C4
D0
t  e 
k0
D0
 1 

  k0
D0
  1

; (36)
which must be equal to k0 at t = 0: Indeed, by the denition, W [ezz] = z;
therefore, the RHS of Eq. (36) at t = 0 equals D0
n
 1 
h
  k0D0   1
io
= k0:
Since  C4=D0 < 0; D0 < 0; and W is monotonically growing function with
13Lambert W function is the solution to the equation yey = z; namely, y = W (z): The
derivative (for z 6=  1=e) of W is dW=dz = W (z)= [z (1 +W (z))] ; and the antiderivative of
W (z) (using the substitution w =W (z)) z = wew ) is R W (z)dz = z [W (z)  1 + 1=W (z)]+
C: In more details about the Lambert W function see, e.g., Corless et al. (1996).
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limz!1W (z) = 1; capital is growing with no limit along a path that grows
faster than a linear function (Fig. 6). Formula (36) can be considered as a
closed form solution for k(t) (using an alternative denition of this notion) since
function W is uniquely dened for k0 > 0;14 and numerical implementations of
this function are available in major computational software.
Substitution for k(t) into Eq. (24) gives the closed form path of investments,
which, using the optimal saving rule _k = q; implies the paths of output, con-
sumption, and extraction:
q(t) = q0
(
B1
D0

 1 W

e 
C4
D0
t  e 
k0
D0
 1 

  k0
D0
  1
 1
+ C3
)
; (37)
c(t) = c0
(
B1
D0

 1 W

e 
C4
D0
t  e 
k0
D0
 1 

  k0
D0
  1
 1
+ C3
)
; (38)
r(t) = q(t)1=k(t) = ; (39)
where c0 = (1  )q0: On the other hand, the constant utility criterion implies
that c(t) = c0[(s0   s(t)) + 1]'; yielding (for ' = ) the equation for the path
of the current reserve:
s(t) = s0   1

n
B1k(t)
 1
+ C3
o1=
  1

:
In the limit, this formula becomes s1 = limt!1 s(t) = s0   1

C
1=
3   1

=
s0 

1 + k1 0 r
1 
0
1=
  1

=: Then, the e¢ ciency condition s0 =
R1
0
rdt
results in the following relationship between k0; s0; and r0 :
r0 =
nh
(s0+ 1)
   1
i
=
 
k1 0 
o1=(1 )
: (40)
Note that r0 is a decreasing function of  in this case (Fig. 1), which means
that the greater the intensity of the hazard the larger the amount of the resource
14Function W (z) is uniquely dened for z >  1=e implying that k0 should sat-
isfy the condition e
 C4
D0
t  e 
k0
D0
 1 

  k0
D0
  1

>  1=e for any t > 0: This in-
equality holds when   k0
D0
  1 > 0 or k0 >  D0 ( D0 is a positive number here:
 D0 =  B1=C3 = k= 0 r1 0 =
h
1 + k1 0 r
1 
0
i
). Then, after dividing both sides by
k0=

1 + k1 0 r
1 
0

; the condition of the uniqueness of the representation via the Lambert
W function for the case with  = 2 is 1 + k1 0 r
1 
0 > k
1 
0 r
1 
0 ; which is always true.
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that should be left for the future in order to o¤set the hazard with the growth
of consumption according to the criterion. At the same time, reallocation of the
resource to the future attens the path of temperature until the rates of growth
of temperature and consumption completely compensate for each other.
The initial tax on extraction should be higher (Fig. 2) for a larger ; and
the initial level of consumption should be lower as a result of a lower r0. Letting
! 0 and using the LHôpitals rule, condition (40) becomes
r00 = lim
!0
r0 =
 
s0=k
1 
0
 1
1  (41)
coinciding with the expression (32) in the Solow-Hartwick case for  = 2:
Formula (40) species condition (10) of the optimality of the growing ini-
tial extraction depending on the hazard factors. Namely, the second inequal-
ity of this condition becomes  R k1 0 =
n
k1 0
h
(s0+ 1)
   1
io
or 1 R
=
h
(s0+ 1)
   1
i
; yielding
_r0 R 0 i¤  R
(1 + )1=   1
s0
: (42)
According to this condition, the optimal pattern of extraction can be hump-
shaped even in the case with a small intensity of the hazard  when the initial
reserve s0 is large. An example of the optimal hump-shaped extraction path is
provided in the next section (Fig. 4, solid line).
Formula (30) for  = 2 becomes
0 = k

0 r
 1
0   k0=s0: (43)
The explicit dependence of the initial tax on the hazard parameter  results
from combining Eqs. (40) and (43):
0() =
k0
(s0+ 1)
   1
  k0
s0
: (44)
Expressed in the terms of the resource price, the initial tax is 0()=qr(0) =
1  k1 0 =
 
s0r0()
 1 or
0()=qr(0) = 1  (s0+ 1)
   1
s0
:
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This equation shows (using the LHôpitals rule) that 0()=qr(0) asymptoti-
cally approaches unity with !1 starting from zero when  = 0 (Fig. 2).
It can be easily shown that the asymptotes15 for q(t) and c(t) given by Eqs.
(37) and (38) coincide with q1 and c1 given by formulas (8) and (9) for ' = .
For example, q1 = q0C3 = q0

1 + k1 0 r
1 
0

; which after substitution for
r0 from formula (40) yields formula (8) with ' = :
Given Eq. (29) and the other paths (36) (39), the path of the tax in terms
of the resource price =qr is =qr = 0k==

k
=
0 k
r 1

 (q=q0)1= 1+1;
which can be rewritten as follows:
(t)
qr(t)
= q(t)1= 1
"
0
k
=
0
  1
q
1= 1
0
#
+ 1: (45)
The boundedness of output in this problem implies the value of the asymptote
for =qr; using Eqs. (8) and (43):
1
qr1
= q11= 1
"
0
k
=
0
  1
q
1= 1
0
#
+ 1
=
0q
1= 1
0 (s0+ 1)
1 
k
=
0
  (s0+ 1)1  + 1
=
r 10 q
1=
0 (s0+ 1)
1    q1= 10 (s0+ 1)1  k0=s0
k
=
0
  (s0+ 1)1  + 1
= 1  k
1 =
0
s0
q
1= 1
0 (s0+ 1)
1 
= 1  k
1 
0
s0
r1 0 (s0+ 1)
1 
;
which after substitution for r0 from Eq. (40) becomes
1
qr1
= 1  1
s0
h
(s0+ 1)  (s0+ 1)1 
i
: (46)
Using the properties of the Lambert W function, it can be shown that for
any parameters of the problem the tax becomes negative in the long run when
 > 0: Namely, from Eq. (46), the condition that 1=qr1 < 0 for s0 > 0 is
(s0+ 1)   (s0+ 1)1  > s0: The substitutions p := s0 + 1 and  v :=
1    + 1=(p   1) (or  = v + 1 + 1=(p   1)) transform this condition into the
15The asymptotes follows from the fact that limz!1W (z) =1:
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Figure 1: The dependence of the initial rate of extraction r0 on the hazard factor :
following form:16 p vp 1=(p 1) <  v(p  1); which can be rewritten as
vpv <  p
 1=(p 1)
p  1 or e
v ln pv ln p <  p
 1=(p 1)
p  1 ln p:
The denition of the Lambert W function yields
v ln p < W ( p
 1=(p 1)
p  1 ln p) or v <
W ( p 1=(p 1)p 1 ln p)
ln p
:
The last inequality in the original variables is
 < 1 +
W
h
  (s0+1) 1=s0s0 ln (s0+ 1)
i
ln (s0+ 1)
+
1
s0
: (47)
Since W (zez) = z (denoting z :=   1s0 ln (s0+ 1)), the numerator of the rst
fraction in (47) is
W

  1
s0
ln (s0+ 1) (s0+ 1)
 1=s0

=   1
s0
ln (s0+ 1) ;
and then condition (47) becomes  < 1;which is always true in this problem.
Hence, if  > 0; there exists t > 0 such that (t) < 0 for any t > t and for any
values of the parameters in this problem (see, e.g., Fig. 3).
16The same inequality can be obtained from Eq. (45) as a condition of the existence of the
moment of time where =qr becomes negative.
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Figure 2: The dependence of the initial tax in terms of the initial resource price 0()=qr(0)
on the hazard factor :
5. Numerical example
Let the shares of capital and the resource are  = 0:3 17 and  = 0:15; the
hazard function parameters: ' = ;  = 0:02; T0 = 1; the initial stocks of the
economy: s0 = 371 bln t, k0 = 14:35:18 Formula (40) yields the optimal initial
rate of extraction r0 = 3:524 bln t/year (cf. r0 = 12:61 bln t/year for  = 0;
Fig. 1). This reduced initial extraction results from the tax 0 = 0:0756 (or in
the terms of the resource price 0=qr(0) = 0:66) applied at t = 0 and estimated
by formula (44).
The externality causes the following deviation from the standard Hotelling
rule at t = 0 : (0) = Ts0 s(0)uT (0)= (uc(0)qr(0)) = T0'( c0=T 20 )=

k0 r
 1
0 =T0

=
 (1   )k0 r0=

k0 r
 1
0

=  (1   )r0 or (0) =  0:0599: Eq. (28) yields
17See, e.g., Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).
18To make the example more illustrative, these initial values imply the rate of extraction r0
that is close to the current world oil rate of extraction given s0 as the world oil reserve estimate.
Namely, the world rate of crude oil extraction on January 1, 2010 is 70502.6 [1000 b/day]/7.3
[b/t]  365  10 6 = 3.525 [bln t/year] (World Oil, 2009). CERA (2006) claimed that
actual world oil reserve in 2006 was three times larger (about 512 bln t) than the conventional
estimate. I take here s0 = 2 185:5 = 371 [bln t] = 21,354,182,395 [1000 b]/7.3 [b/t] 
10 6; where 185.5 [bln t] is the conventional estimate (World Oil, 2009). One ton of crude oil
equals here 7.3 barrels.
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Figure 3: The path of the tax in terms of the resource price (t)=qr(t): In the Solow-Hartwick
case the tax is zero.
_(0) = 0qk(0)+(0)qr(0): The initial values of marginal productivities qk(0) =
k 10 r

0 = 0:056 and qr(0) = k

0 r
 1
0 = 0:11 result in _(0) =  0:0026 show-
ing that the tax is declining at t = 0:
The path of the tax in terms of the resource price (45) is depicted in Fig. 3.
The tax becomes negative after 40 years and approaches the negative asymptote
1=qr1 =  1:07:
Capital for  = 0:02 (Fig. 6, solid line) grows faster than a linear function.19
Linear capital in the Solow-Hartwick case (Fig. 6, circles) has a steeper slope
( _k00 = 0:488) due to the higher rate of extraction at t = 0: The optimal paths of
per capita consumption for the cases with  = 0:02 and  = 0 are in Fig. 7.
The tax imposed by the planner for  = 0:02 results in a hump-shaped
optimal path of extraction (Fig. 4, solid line). The path in circles in Fig. 4
corresponds to the case with  = 0 (Solow-Hartwick case, no tax). Note that,
in the conventional approach,20 a relatively small uncertainty in the hazard
parameter leads to a large uncertainty in the short-run resource policy (Figs.
2  5). The model shows that if the planner is unaware of the externality
19This linear function k0 + _k0t with k0 and _k0 = 0:403 for  = 0:02 is depicted as a dotted
line in Fig. 6
20 I mean here the approach where r0 is to be derived as an optimal or equilibrium value.
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Figure 4: The optimal paths of extraction: for  = 0:02 - solid line, for  = 0 (Solow-Hartwick
case) - circles.
or is going to neglect its e¤ect and implement an economic program with the
maximum constant per capita consumption over time, she should apply the
policies that will result in the current rate of extraction r0 = 12:61 bln t/year,
which is 3.6 higher than in the case with  = 0:02:
The uncertainty of the conventional approach in dening r0 with respect
to the imprecision of the reserve estimate s0 is illustrated in Figs. 5a and 5b,
where s10 is a conventional world oil reserve estimate (World Oil, 2009), s
3
0 is
the estimate of CERA (2006), and s20 = 2  s10 is the estimate that is used
in this example as s0 and is somewhere between s10 and s
3
0: Note that a small
hazard factor (Fig. 5b) results in higher uncertainty than the large one since,
for the larger values of ; the initial rate of extraction should be essentially
lower, reducing the uncertainty of this value.
For a small extracting rm that has just discovered or obtained an oil eld
at an auction, an approach that provides the initial rate of extraction as a policy
recommendation could be possible when the oil-extracting capital is available
in required quantities and the elasticity of the demand for the resource is high.
However, for a large incumbent rm that has been extracting the resource for
a period of time and is going to reestimate the optimal path, this approach can
be questionable due to the high volatility of this recommendation with respect
18
Figure 5: The dependence of the initial rate of extraction r0 [bln t/year] on the reserve s0
for di¤erent values of the hazard factors  : (a)  = 0:02; (b)  = 0; s10 = 185:5 bln t  the
current world oil reserve according to World Oil (2009); s20 = 2 185:5 bln t; s30 = 512:3 bln
t CERA (2006) world oil reserve estimate.
to uncertainties.
For example, if the extraction was started under the constant consumption
criterion ( = 0) and with the initial reserve estimate s0 = s10; the initial rate
of extraction would be r10 = 5:58 bln t/year (Fig. 5b). The announcement
similar to CERA (2006) about the larger actual reserve s0 = s30 would cause
the immediate jump in the rate of extraction up to the new value r30 = 18:44
bln t/year as a result of the reestimation of the optimal path using the same
approach. Then, if the social planner takes into account information about the
hazards of the extraction of the resource and decides to follow the constant
utility path with  = 0:02; the imposed tax should instantly cut down the rate
of extraction to the new initial value br30 = 4:2 bln t/year (Fig. 5a).
The e¤ect of deviation of the optimal path from the initially estimated path
recalculated at a later date is called dynamic inconsistencyin the literature.21
In this case, inconsistency takes the form of considerable discontinuous jumps in
21For example, Newbery (1981) considered various reasons for dynamic inconsistency in oil
markets including the changes in the market structure.
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Figure 6: The optimal paths of capital: for  = 0:02 - solid line, the linear path for  = 0
(Solow-Hartwick case) - circles, the path k0 + _k0t with k0 and _k0 for  = 0:02 - dotted line.
resource policies that can lead to socioeconomic and environmental damage;22
some of these jumps can be unrealizable in practice.
Hence, the approaches that result in the paths that are discontinuous with
respect to the initial state of economy could be appropriate only for small rms
entering the market or for theoretical studies where the questions of the tran-
sition to an optimal state are not important (Bazhanov, 2010). In many cases,
reestimation of the optimal path requires a solution that is linked to the ini-
tial conditions, including the initial state of the extracting industry (Bazhanov,
2009a, Section 9; Bazhanov, 2009b).23
6. Concluding remarks
This paper has o¤ered an example of the closed form solution for the problem
of irreversible global warming under the constant utility criterion (Stollery, 1998)
with utility negatively a¤ected by the hazard factor. The solution was expressed
via the Lambert W special function, which has convenient analytical properties
22One can recall the consequences of the oil embargo in 1973.
23Pezzey (2004, formula (15), p. 477) o¤ered an example of solving the problem of dy-
namic inconsistency by specifying the discount factor in the utilitarian criterion for given
technological parameters and the current state of economy.
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Figure 7: The optimal paths of per capita consumption: for  = 0:02 - solid line with the
asymptote (dotted line), the constant path for  = 0 (Solow-Hartwick case) - circles.
for any parameters in this problem. For example, using the properties of this
function, it was shown that the declining tax in this problem becomes negative
in the long run.
The main qualitative distinctions of this problem from the Solow-Hartwick
case with no hazard are:
(a) output and consumption are growing and asymptotically approaching
positive constants;
(b) the initial rate of the resource extraction is lower, implying (for the same
initial capital) lower levels of initial output and consumption;
(c) the economy is e¢ cient only asymptotically with exhaustion of the pol-
luting resource;
(d) the optimal path of the resource extraction can be hump-shaped;
(e) capital is growing faster than a linear function.
The example has shown that the initial rate of extraction and the initial
tax, provided in the conventional approach as policy recommendations, can be
signicantly uncertain due to the uncertainties in the initial reserve and in the
intensity of the hazard. The uncertainty is considerably higher in the case of
the low values of the intensity of the hazard (Figs. 1, 2, 4, and 5).
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